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Clyde Emery
and
Arthur Harding:
Two Distinguished Professors

By
A. J. Thomas, Jr.

On May 1st the School of Law
lost two of its most distinguished
professors when both Emeritus Professor of Law Clyde Emery and
Emeritus Professor of Law Arthur
Leon Harding died after prolonged
illnesses. The entire Law School
Community was shaken and deeply
saddened by their passing. Each of
them contributed a major portion of
their life to the Law School and we
are all indebted to them for their
insistence on excellence from their
students.
Clyde Emery was born in 1899 in
Slater, Missouri. He received his
Bachelor of Arts degree in
Economics from the University of
Wisconsin where he was a member
of Phi Beta Kappa. He was awarded
a Rhodes Scholarship and attended
Oxford University and received his
Bachelor of Laws degree from Harvard. Prior to teaching at SMU, he
was an Associate Professor of Law
at Baylor University. Professor
Emery taught at SMU from 1938
until his retirement in 1964 as Professor Emeritus of Law.

Former students will not forget
Professor Emery's dedication to
health and his energy method lectures to first year students. He also
lectured senior law students on
techniques for legal briefing and
how to maintain one's enthusiasm
for the practice of law. He donated
his booklet entitled A Streamlined
Briefing Technique to the Law Student Division of the American Bar
Association which publishes and
distributes the booklet. He was
truly a "student's" professor and
was never too busy to share his time
and expertise with those that sought
his counsel.
Arthur Leon Harding, known to
students as "The Colonel", was a
native of Fayetteville, Arkansas.
He received his Bachelor of Arts
degree from the University of Arkansas, his Juris Doctor degree
from the University of Michigan
and his Doctor of the Science of
Law degree from Harvard University. Professor Harding taught at the
School of Law from 1927 until 1933
when he left Dallas for seven years

to teach at the University ofldaho.
He served in the Army during
World War II and thereafter returned to SMU to teach law until his
retirement in 1972 as Professor
Emeritus of Law.
The Colonel was a true disciple of
the Socratic method of teaching and
tested the students each time they
entered his classroom. He did not
compromise in the search for legal
efcellence but demanded no more
of his students than he did from
himself.
I am thankful that I was able to
share my career at SMU with both
Clyde and Arthur. They were both
extraordinary individuals, fine
teachers and scholars of the law.
Because of the interest shown by
friends, alumni and the law school
faculty, separate funds have been
established in honor of both Professors Emery and Harding. Individuals desiring to make a contribution
in their memory can make it to the
Clyde Emery Memorial Book Fund
or the Arthur Leon Harding Memorial Fund.
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An Interview With the Chief Justice
of the Supreme (:ourt of India:
The Honorable Y. V. Chandrachud
FOREWORD
On the evening of January 10,
1979, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India, the Honorable
Y. V. Chandrachud, granted an interview for publication in The Brief
The interview was conducted at the
private residence of the Chief Justice
in New Delhi, India. For forty-five
minutes, the Honorable Y. V. Chandrachud responded candidly to a
series of questions concerning the
Constitution, the Legal System and
the Government oflndia. On the following pages, the interview is represented as it was given that evening.
To comprehend fully the import of
Mr. Chandrachud's responses, it is
necessary to place his explanations in
the context of the country over which
he presides as Chief Justice.
India achieved independence from
British rule on August 15, 1947. The
Country became a Sovereign Democratic Republic on January 26, 1950,
having enacted and adopted a written Constitution on November 26,
1949. Today, India is a country of
complexities and considerations
some of which vastly differ from conditions within the United States. The
Government of India must contend
with a land which measures approximately one-third the area of the United States, but whose population
more than triples that of America.
Within a country of 1,262,275 square
miles may be found a multitude in
excess of 600 million people.
Twenty-one States and nine Union
Territories presently constitute the
country of India. The governing
body of India is the Parliament,
comprised of the President of India
and two Houses, known respectively
as the Council of States and the
House of the People. The Council of
States is composed of twelve members, individuals nominated by the
President for their special knowledge
or practical experience in the areas of
literature, science, art and social service. The Council of States addition4

ally consists of not more than 250
representatives of the States and
Union Territories, selected by the
elected members of the State Legislative Assembly. The House of the
People consists of not more than 525
members chosen by direct election
from territorial constituencies within
the States and of not more than 25
members representing the Union
Territories.
The Government of India is appropriately described as "federal in
structure but unitary in spirit.'' Like
other federations, India possesses a
written constitution with powers
clearly distributed between the Central Government and the Units--the
States and Territories. India also
possesses a Supreme Court established to interpret the Constitution
and to decide disputes between the
Central Government and the Units.
But the Indian Government has a distinctive unitary composition. One
Constitution has been adopted not
only for the Union but also for the
various States. Equality of status
with the Central Government has not
been accorded to the States and
Union Territories. India's unitary
structure is further evidenced by
provision within its Constitution for
a single citizenship and a single integrated judiciary.
The highest court of the land is the
Supreme Court of India, situated in
New Delhi. The Constitution oflndia
vests the Supreme Court with original and appellate jurisdication as
well as advisory powers. Appeals to
the Supreme Court may be taken in
any civil or criminal matter from any
judgment, decree or final order of a
High Court-the equivalent of a
State Supreme Court in America-if
the High Court certifies that the case
involves a substantial question of law
as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Alternatively, the Supreme
Court may grant special leave to appeal from such judgment, decree or

final order if satisfied that the case
involves a substantial question of law
with regard to the interpretation of
the Constitution and the High Court
has refused certification. Appeals to
the High Court of a State or Territory are taken from the lower or District Courts. Finally, the Constitution of India provides for the establishment of a common High Court for
two or more States.
It is with knowledge of this governmental structure and judicial organization that the Honorable Chief
Justice's answers to the following
questions achieve their proper significance. Mr. Chandrachud's responses were contextually directed to
the unique conditions and complexities of India. Some of the questions posed difficulties. But the Chief
Justice was, at all times, gracious and
candid. The Editorial Staff of The
Brief is greatly appreciative of the
opportunity for this interview afforded by the Honorable Y. V.
Chandrachud, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of India.

Interviewed by Jacqueline Varma
Honorable Chief Justice Chandrachud, would you briefly tell of
your legal background before you
were appointed to the position of Justice of the Supreme Court of India?
I practiced in Bombay as a lawyer
for approximately 17 or 18 years.
Thereafter, I became a Judge of the
High Court of Bombay in 1961.
Acording to Article 124 of the Indian
Constitution, the President of India
is to appoint the Chief Justice and all
the Supreme Court Justices. Were
you in fact appointed by the President of India?
That is correct. I was appointed
by the President in consultation
with the Chief Justice of the Bench,
(continued on page 6)

President's Report

A Year of Transition
Edward A. Copley
President, SMU Law Alumni Association
1978-1979

From the viewpoint of the Law
School alumni, the last fiscal year
was significant in two major respects. First, it regettably marked
the year in which Dean Charles 0.
Galvin resigned as the Dean of the
School of Law. Dean Galvin's
prominence at the Law School, in
Dallas, and nationwide is well
known; his relationship with the
alumni of the Law School has been
outstanding. When he became Dean
in 1963, there were approximately
2,000 alumni of the Law School.
Today, there are 5,100 alumni located throughout the world. During
his term as Dean, this statistical increase of over two and a half times
the number of alumni is a mere
numerical indication of Dean Galvin's and the Law School's growth.
The quality of the Law School
can be measured in many ways.
Buildings and libraries are one
criteria, and an important one. The
most important criteria is peoplefaculty, students, and alumni. The
practicing legal professional measures the quality of the School by
the students it hires and by the
alumni with which it works. Under
Dean Galvin's deanship, the quality
and the reputation of all three of
these groups has grown, and the
alumni is indeed indebted to him for
his leadership and dedication.
The second significant event of
the fiscal year was the conducting of
the Law School Fund, headed by
Robert L. (Skip) Trimble. At the
time of the writing of this report, the
fund drive for the current year has
been successfully completed. In the
Winter issue of The Brief, Bill Powell made a strong case for the con-

tinuation of a vital, independent
Law School Fund. His arguments
then are still valid. The importance
of the alumni support to the Law
School Fund cannot be underestimated. Just recently, a change in the
time of the annual Law School Fund
has been authorized by the alumni
council. Specifically, next year's
fund drive will be conducted at the
same time as the general SMU sustentation drive. While this might involve some logistical adjustments in
the first year, in the long run, the
change should result in a more productive campaign. I solicit your
strong support for the Law School,
not just financially, but your support in the participation of Law
School activities.
Twenty years ago it seems that a
graduate could expect to spend his
legal life structuring and resolving
relationships between private parties and to have some involvement
with government regulation
(primarily, taxes and securities.)
Today, a graduate expects to deal
with a body of private law, which is
exceedingly complex, and can anticipate every day contact with government bodies and regulatory
agencies, the nomenclature of
which has exhausted the alphabet.
No wonder that three times the
number of law graduates are admitted to the bar annually than was the
case twenty years ago. These conditions illustrate the necessity of
alumni support to insure that the
students who graduate from SMU
Law School are of the highest quality.
As I was about to mail this report
to the editor, sad news reached us.

On the same day, ironically Law
Day, May 1, 1979, two beloved
members of the law school family
passed away: Clyde Emery and Arthur L. Harding. Who could ever
forget the impact of these two men
on their legal training? Each was
unique, different from the other in
style and personality. But in two
ways that come to mind, they were
so similar. Each was totally dedicated to the law and the legal profession, and each was highly respected and loved by the many students they trained. Each was the
epitome of the word "Professor."
We shall miss them very much.

SBA Establishes
Galvin Library
Fund
The Student Bar Association
made a $1,000 gift for the establishment of an endowment fund at the
Underwood Law Library in honor
of Dean Charles O. Galvin. The
fund, officially entitled "The
Charles 0. Galvin Library Endowment Fund," will be used for the
acquisition of books, materials and
supplies for the Law Library.
John Hecker, Vice-President of
the SBA, announced the establishment of the fund and acknowledged
the 15 years of superior leadership
provided by Dean Galvin to the
School. Hecker encouraged students, former students and all interested parties to join with the SBA
and contribute to this fund in honor
of Dean Galvin.
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the Chief Justice of India.
Article 124 (3) (a), (b), (c) states that
the Supreme Court Justices are to be
chosen from the High Court Judges,
the High Court Advocates and from
among distinguished jurists. How
are the names of such judges and advocates submitted to the President?

Generally, the convention is that
the Chief Justice of India, after
some informal consultation with his
colleagues, will receive the names
of those who are the most suitable
from amongst the practicing
lawyers and the High Court Judges
for appointment to the Supreme
Court. The Chief Justice will then
discuss the names submitted to him
with the Law Minister of the Central
Government and thereafter forward
the names to the Prime Minister.
Thereafter, there may be some discussion between the Law Minister
and the Prime Minister and perhaps
a name may be eliminated. But generally, the Chief Justice's recommendations are accepted by the
Government.
Is Parliament required to approve
the selection of Chief Justice made by
the President?

No, selection of the Chief Justice
does not require the approval of Parliament.
The Constitution does not refer to the
Prime Minister, with the exception of
Articles 74 and 75 calling for a Council of Ministers consisting of a Prime
Minister appointed by the President
and the other ministers appointed by
the President on the advice of the
Prime Minister. Would you explain
the relationship between the President and the Prime Minister and the
Council of Ministers?

So far as the President is concerned, whenever our Constitution
by and large states that some constitutional obligation or duty must
be discharged by the President, it
means really with the aid and advice
of the Cabinet of Ministers, the
Council of Ministers. Therefore,
when the President appoints a Judge
of the Supreme Court or Chief Justice of India, the appointment is in
fact made with the aid and advice of
his Council of Ministers.
Why does the Constitution oflndia so
6

often mention the President when in
reality it is the Prime Minister who
discharges the official duties mandated by the Constitution?
It is not really the Prime Minister
who performs the official functions.
It is the Council of Ministers headed
by the Prime Minister. The C_onstitution does not refer to the Pnme
Minister for three significant
reasons. If the Constitution merely
mentioned the Prime Minister, then
the functions executed by the other
Ministers would be excluded. Secondly, if only the Prime Minister or
Council of Ministers were mentioned then there would be no official d~ties for the President to discharge. If, for example, the Constitution were to provide that the
appointment of the Chief Justice of
India shall be executed by the
Council of Ministers, the President
will have no Constitutional obligation to discharge. And finally, the
reference to the President in our
Constitution serves another very
significant purpose. The President
does not belong to any particular
(political) party. Therefore, there is
a certain amount of dispassionate
neutrality and some degree of nonpolitical examination of the problef!l
at issue. And even though the President himself may not be able to direct or require an appointment, he is
at least able to make suggestions
and counter-suggestions. He is able
to request the Council of Ministers
to re-examine the question and reconsider the alternatives. The fact
that reconsideration of any Constitutional or political problem may
be requested by a non-partisan President is an important contribution.

But in fact, does not Article 74 mandate that the President shall follow
the advice of the Council of Ministers?

That is correct. The President is
really bound by the advice tendered
to him by the Council of Ministers.
Whenever the people of India state
that the President has appointed the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
it is the Council of Ministers in reality. More particularly, in the case of
the Chief Justice, it is the Prime
Minister who has the dominant
voice in the matter, although the
Prime Minister will perhaps also

have the assistance of the Law
Minister.
But the selection of the Chief Justice cannot involve the entire
Cabinet of Ministers. You see, there
are twenty-five Ministers of the
Cabinet rank. A large number of
these Ministers will not have any
intimate knowledge of the particular
matter at issue-in this case, selection of a Chief Justice. For example,
a Minister in charge of housing may
be a very eminent person in his own
area and may have very valuable
information on the subject which
concerns his ministry. But whether
a law is beneficial or not, whether a
Judge is qualified or not, are matters
which do not really fall within the
normal course of his duties. So as to
the appointment of a Chief Justice,
there is little contribution that such
a Minister can make.
In the United States, many Congressmen possess a law degree. Is the
Council of Ministers similarly comprised of lawyer-politicians?

Currently, almost all of the Council of Ministers are very highly educated. You will seldom find a
member of the Council of Ministers
who is not a (college) graduate. And
in most of the cases, the Minister is
a double graduate. Most of the
Ministers are very highly qualified
academically. But not all of them
are lawyers, although the percentage of lawyers is also quite high
among the members of our legislature. A large number of the Ministers do in fact have legal qualifications. Although they may not have
practiced, many of our Council
members have studied law.
I believe Article 124 mandates that
there shall be no more than seven
Judges of the Supreme Court. Is that
the present number of Supreme
Court Justices?

No. When the Constitution was
first enacted, the Supreme Court
consisted of seven Judges. But
there has been an amendment and
the number of Supreme Court
Judges is sixteen. Actually, under
the amendment, the number has
been increased to eighteen and this
ceiling cannot be exceeded until
(continued on page 11)

Is Law Part of
The Human Estate?
by Ronald K. Wetherington
Professor of Anthropology
Southern Methodist University
Among the Kapauku Papuans, a
headman unobtrusively approaches
an argument between two men.
After quietly listening, he begins
questioning the participants informally, occasionally seeking the
opinions of others. He then offers a
solution to the dispute. When this
avails no agreement, he alternatively threatens and pleads, weeps
and shouts, dances and harangues
until at last the resolution is accepted and the dispute settled.
In the New Guinea Highlands,
another leader confronts a marriage
dispute by silently bringing to it his
bow and quiver. Without speaking,
he sits calmly and begins sharpening
his arrows. The dispute quickly
ends: a year earlier, he had settled a
similar quarrel by shooting one who
had violated the peace. The implication and prognosis are not lost on
the present participants, although
not a word has been spoken.
Are these instances of legal behavior? Do these non-literate
societies entertain the rule of
"law"? These questions are important to the anthropologist for
reasons which define the goals and
methods of anthropological research: to understand human systems through a comparative and
cross-cultural approach. That such
understanding involves making
valid generalizations about those
systems (both social and biological), and thus distinguishing the
unique from the pervasive, lends
special character to this young and
frequently controversial science.
The advantages of this approach

to law to those whose interests are
the practice of law and the conduct
of American jurisprudence are more
than purely intellectual. The discovery that rights and obligations
are effectively promulgated and
preserved in a variety of circumstances not involving codification contributes to our appreciation
of the advantages as well as the limitations oflegal statutes and abstract
rules. The revelation that the efficiency of social control is not
everywhere a function of physically
coercive sanctions lends insight to
our present concern over the relationships among law, order, and
punishment. It is furthermore instructive in understanding or promoting social change to discover
which elements in Western law are
fundamental to the human estate
and which products of a particular
historical legacy.
Let me be quick to deny any claim
that the anthropological study of
law is a panacea-in-waiting for practitioners who wish to understand
the law. This was the conviction of
Mr. Justice Holmes, however, and
its approach was espoused by the
jurist Roscoe Pound, among others.
I claim only that the comparative
non-Western approach reveals the
fundamental countenance of law
and its essential form.
The two incidents in the opening
paragraphs are described by the
foremost scholar in the field,
Leopold Pospisil (1972), the first
from his own field research and the
second from that of Edwin Cook.
The cases illustrate the operation of

law in societies without codified statutes or formal judicial process.
Thus, substantively, procedurally,
and structurally, they would fall
outside the Western definition of
law espoused by many.
The cases do reflect four essential
elements which, according to Pospisil, qualify them as possessing the
character of law. These are: 1) the
existence of authority, whether vested in an individual or a group; 2) the
intention, whether explicit or implicit, of universal application; 3)
the recognition of obligatio, a term
referencing the social (and legal) relationship of the parties to a dispute,
pointing both to the duties of the
defendant and the rights of the person or persons which were violated
by the delict; and 4) the presence of
a sanction - whether positive or
negative, physical or psychological
- which may be invoked by the
authority in threat or in fact to enforce the decision in a dispute.
The further - and more elaborate
- description of these elements is
found in Pospisil's Anthropology of
Law. It may be argued that these, at
best, constitute the criteria for judging a decision to be legal, but do not
constitute law per se. After all, a
legal decision is not only one which
exercises social control, but one
which has the weight of "the law"
behind it, not intrinsically within it.
This raises the question, therefore, of what the essential structure
of form of law is - one where one
searches to find "law". The heritage of Western law, particularly in
(continued on next page)
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its early ties to the Twelve Tables of
Rome and the subsequent codifications of Justinian, emphasi~es
abstract rules as the ultimate basis
of legal behavior (for example, in
the seminal Ancient Law by Sir
Henry Maine). Thus to many, the
absence of a set of abstract rules or
principles - codified guides to the
correction of delicts - signifies the
absence of law. This criterion, if
applied thoroughly, would exclude
most non-Western societies from
rule by law, and would furthermore
include as law in Western societies
those norms and rules which are
either "dead" or have no longer the
meaning they once had and are thus
not literally enforced.
The essential form of law which
Pospisil accepts as critical is the
legal decision and the principles
which may be abstracted from it.
His approach, following Holmes
and John Austin, as well as notable
anthropologists such as Hoebel,
Smith and Roberts, and Nader, is
analytical and casuistic. In the use
of case studies of actual decisions,
from which legal principles and the
structure of law are extracted, the
scientist, Pospisil claims, can
''make the concept of law exact,
cross-culturally comparative, and
universal" (Pospisil, 1972 at 14). It
is moreover in casuistic analysis
that change in the meaning oflaws,
and the social structure within
which law occurs, may be recorded.
This reveals law as it actually affects behavior rather than as it ideally should influence it.
By this argument, then, both the
form and the substance of law are
best discovered in the decisions
made by legal authorities. This encompasses the notion oflaw by precedent rather than by abstract rule,
and allows the four attributes previously noted to serve as the
touchstone to comparative analysis
of the nature of law.
Scholars influenced by our Western jurisprudential heritage can find
reasons to object to this notion of
law on several counts. Perhaps
most central in the tradition of
Western law is the notion of
abstract rules which embody legal
principles and guide the administration of justice. A formal legalistic
view would restrict law to codes and
statutes, whether written or recalled, and thus eliminate from the
8

purview of law all behavior not so
ordained. However, one may argue
that such a distinction makes law a
more arbitrary and less workable
concept, even in our own society.
This is notwithstanding the myth
still reverently espoused that the
only proper function of the jurist in
treating a social act is to find the law
and apply it, not to create it.
This ideal was firmly commended
by Holmes himself, despite his advocacy of the casuistic approach, in
the landmark case of Buck v Bell.
"The law", he wrote
does all that is needed when it
does all that it can, indicates a
policy, applies it to all within the
lines, and seeks to bring within
the lines all similarly situated so
far as so fast as its means allow.
(274 U.S. 208)

While the ideal may provide a
foundation for the legal process,
few would hesitate to admit that
creative insight (or, less presumptuously, circumstantial innovation)
not only plays a critical part in maintaining the law's vitality, but frequently changes its interpreted
meaning. We may ask, for example,
where an adequate understanding of
civil rights law may be genuinely
acquired: in the legislative acts of
1954 et. seq., or in the interpretive
evolutionary steps between Brown
v Board of Education and Regents
of the University of California v
Allan Bakke.
Furthermore, and from the other
side of the legalistic coin as noted
previously, a restriction of•' law'' to
"abstract rules" would include the
numerous "dead rules" which,
whether obsolete or relatively recent, are never applied. These are
common in state and local statutes,
and each of us 'probably has favorite
examples. These exist, indeed, in
societies without written codes as
well, and if law is a means of institutionalized social control their
inclusion thereby gives a misrepresentation, particularly for the anthropologist. A particularly fretful
example is the rule prohibiting incest, differentially defined in many
societies on the basis of fictive kinship, and often as differentially followed in practice.
It is more appropriately the principles behind the codified laws, as
these are revealed, crystallized, and
made explicit in legal decisions, and
not the abstract codifications them-

selves, that provide us with the
tools for analysis and comparison.
More than the statutes themselves,
the concrete application of their
principles reveal the structure of
law in society, When this is accepted, the structure of law may be
found even in the absence of codification.
The confusion of the two concepts, central to Western law,
comes from their being combined in
the English word "law". They are
terminologically distinguished in
other societies with codified laws:
the Latin lex and French loi referring to abstract rules or statutes,
with ius and droit, respectively, denoting the fundamental legal principles which guide social behavior. It
is little wonder that Fried finds as
"almost untranslatable" the definition by the French anthropologist
Marcel Mauss, ••Law (le droit comprises the totality of customs and
laws (les lois)" (Fried, 1967 at 17;
translation mine).
Restrictive definitions of authority and sanction, which are related
concepts, likewise plague the Western scholar seeking law in nonWestern societies. Authority, particularly in legal context, implies
power which is legitimized within
the social group, although formally
the terms may be separate. To
Fried, both terms refer to "the ability to channel the behavior of
others," power employing the use
of sanctions, and authority referring
to such ability in the absence of
sanctions. In the present sense,
legal authority involves power: a
legal decision must be binding on
those whom it covers.
To some scholars, the test oflegal
authority, therefore, lies in the nature of the sanctions available, the
criterion being that the sanctions
carry sufficient threat to coerce
obedience of the authority's decisions. This was the position held by
John Austin, who developed the
analytical school of jurisprudence.
(For a brief but good survey, see
Barnes, 1974). Such sanctions, according to scholars such as Hoebel,
must be physical in nature - either
in threat or in administration - in
order to qualify as legal. If we carry
this line of reasoning further, we
find that the coercive use of force is
seldom found in legitimized authorities without sovereign power,
(continued on page JO)

SMU SCHOOL OF LAW
CENTER FOR ADVANCED PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
CLE PROGRAM SCHEDULE

MAY 1, 1979-JANUARY 1, 1980

From May 1, 1979-January 1, 1980, the programs offered by the Center, including jointly sponsored programs, will
be the following:
May 11

September

Oct. 31-Nov. 2

Basic Family Law (Lubbock)

Bankruptcy Practice under Reform
Act (evening program)
Corporate Practice
Tax and Financial Planning
Financing A Small Business Enterprise

2nd Symposium on Estate Planning

May 17-19

Corporate Tax Planning
July 23-27
Summer Short Courses (Colorado
Springs)
Antitrust: Law and Litigation
Real Estate Taxation

September 26-29

2nd Symposium on Federal Tax
Planning
October 3,4,5

July 30-Aug. 3

Estate Planning (Colorado Springs)

Doing Business in Mexico (Mexico
City)

November 1-2

Availability and Use of Bank Credit

These are programs currently on the
CLE schedule. Future programs
will be announced in later issues of
The Brief. Further information can
also be obtained by calling the CLE
office.

Professional Development Without Pain
How many lawyers feel that they
cannot spare the time for a week
long vacation to the Rocky Mountains? How many lawyer's families
will have to vacation without that
lawyer or will not have a vacation at
all? In an attempt to give the attorneys the opportunity to vacation
with their families without neglecting their professional responsibility
to continue their education, the
Center For Advanced Professional
Development of the SMU School of
Law will offer a series of intensive
short courses for attorneys and
other professionals this summer in
Colorado Springs, Colorado. The
following week-long courses will be
offered:
Short Course on Anti-Trust: Law
and Litigation, July 23-27, 1979.
Faculty for this program will include Jerry L. Beane, Dallas,
Texas; Francis DeLone, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; David L. Foster, New York, New York; John J.
Kanson, Los Angeles, California;
Wilson W. Herndon, Dallas, Texas;
Don T. Hibner, Los Angeles,
California; The Honorable Robert
M. Hill, U. S. District Judge,
Northern District of Texas, Dallas,
Texas; Harold R. Schmidt,
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania; The Hon-

orable John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D. C.
Taxation of Real Estate Transactions, July 23-27, 1979.
Faculty for this program will include Professor J. Scott Morris,
SMU School of Law, Faculty
Chairman; Fred L. Miller, Dallas,
Texas.
Estate Planning, July 30-August 3,
1979.
Faculty for this program will include Professor Regis W.
Campfield, SMU School of Law,
Faculty Chairman; Professor John
H. McCord, University of Illinois
School of Law; Professor Robert A.
Stein, University of Minnesota
School of Law, Vice President for
Administration and Planning, University of Minnesota; Frank Berall,
Hartford, Connecticut; Professor
Edward Halbach, Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley,
California.

Each 30 hour course will meet
over a five day period. Courses will
be certified for credit by states requiring continuing legal education
credits. The courses will meet at

Colorado College.
While the attorneys are improving their professional skills their
families can enjoy the many attractions of Colorado Springs and its
Rocky Mountain surroundings.
Special accommodation arrangements have been made with
Colorado College and the Antlers
Hotel. The Antlers is a Four Star
Mobil Award Hotel, with a heated
outdoor pool and a variety of dining
facilities. Also through its association with the world renowned
Broadmoor Hotel, the Antler's
guests can utilize the Broadmoor
restaurant and golf course facilities.
The accommodations at Colorado
College include dormitory suites
with full meal plans. Guests staying
at the college will have full use of all
campus recreational facilities which
include indoor and outdoor track,
tennis, racquet ball, and handball
courts, weight rooms and an olympic size indoor swimming pool. A
community golf course is also available to individuals who stay at the
College.
For further information contact
the Center for Advanced Professional Development, SMU School
of Law, Dallas, Texas 75275, (214)
692-2624.
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that sovereignty exists only in the
political state, and thus that law,
given this attribute as a criterion, is
confined to the political state. An
escape from this dilemma is the recognition that physical coercion,
along with a vested monopoly in the
use of force, is not a necessary
adjunct to legal authority, although
in the state it is often its most prominent one.
The criteria discussed above,
when judiciously applied crossculturally, reveal that no adequately
studied society is without law. Even
among the primitive bands of
hunters-gatherers, whose numbers
continue to diminish in the
Kalahari, the Arctic, in Tierra del
Fuego, on the Australian outback,
particular cases may be observed in
which the decisions of headmen or
leaders take the guise of legal authority. Notwithstanding the cajoling and whining, nor the obvious
informality with which a decision is
reached, all of the elements are frequently present.
First, the authority is acknowledged as such, apparent from the
acquiescence by all parties to have
him intercede, arbitrate, decide. No
matter whether that authority is
given to him because of his skill and
impartiality rather than because of
any formally assigned power he
commands.
Second, his eventually reached
decision or opinion reflects an intention to establish or maintain a precedent: that similar future disputes
will receive similar disposition. It is
no matter if the decision is reached
because of custom or tradition
rather than through the application
of a codified rule.
Third, the decision or recommendation observes the particular
social relationship which was severed by the cause of the dispute. It
recognizes, as much as does the factual basis for a verdict in our Western courts, the reciprocal rights and
duties of the opposed participants.
It is irrelevant whether these derive
ultimately from kinship, from an
economic relationship, or from
ritual ties.
Fourth, sanction to encourage
acceptance of the decision is
sufficiently strong and emanates
from the decision: that is to say,
recognition of the authority by the
participants is recognition of a
10

commensurate power behind his
decision. That he is more than a
mediator-without-portfolio is revealed by the infrequency with
which his decisions are ignored.
While the decision may in some
cases be achieved by cajoling to
mutual agreement, the decision
once made is followed on pain of
sanctions which, though frequently
sumptuary, are quite effective.
Moral sanctions in a kin-based social structure, we should recognize,
are often as compelling as any formal legal sanction in our society sometimes more so.
We can be deceived into defining
as law only the formal and substantive qualities of Western jurisprudence. In so doing, we miss the rich
diversity of instruments for social
control under which a significant
fraction of the world's population
lives in orderly - and ordered life cycles. Rather than to suggest
that, at a certain stage of social
evolution, "law" enters the repertoire of means to organize behavior,
it may be more instructive to conceptualize law as a procedural instrument in all societies, becoming
more complex, explicit, and compartmentalized where society itself
does.
In science generally, an attempt is
made to seek universal principles in
particular phenomena. The anthropological approach to law is no
different, and analytical categories
are often best viewed as arbitrary
subdivisions of continuous things.
The continuum of social behavioral
control is thus frequently subdivided into the hierarchical sequence of habit-code-rule-law much
as we distinguish the sequence
bay-sea-ocean. Such subdivisions

are analytically useful despite their
abstraction from the "real world."
One may say they are necessary because they abstract.
Thus law, once arbitrarily
categorized for analytical purposes,
may provide the anthropologist
with useful distinctions. Its source
may range from customary to authoritarian, authority may run from
limited to absolute, and sanctions
may be psychological, sumptuary,
economic, or corporal.
In analysis based on new distinctions, new "truths" about the nature of social conduct may be revealed. With the criteria discussed
above, for example, Pospisil notes
that law in society occurs at numerous levels below the law of society
- that in fact some ethnically,
geographically, and linguistically
defined societies may not be unified
under law, while societal segments
therein may be guided by strong
legal authority.
Where the critieria coalesce, we
have the presence oflaw. In the calculus of other approaches, law is
present only in civilized societies.
The final test of validity is, of
course, not whether one or another
approach is the "right" one. It is
rather which approach most enlightens us and informs our ignorance. With the advance of civilization in time and geography, comparative cross-cultural study is
questioning much of what we arrogantly call civilized; is challenging
our exclusive claim to law and justice. The challenge is at once
peremptory and for cause.
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there is a further amendment.

stitutional question.

Would you explain how the Supreme
Court Justices arrive at a majority
decision? In the United States there
are nine Justices, which allows for a
5-4 majority. But when there are 16
or 18 Justices, this even-number
would appear to allow for a splitdecision?

These latter cases which do not involve a constitutional issue are appeals from the High Courts of the
States?

Within the United States Supreme Court, the entire Court sits for
every matter. We do not. That is
one fundamental distinction between the way we work and the way
the United States Supreme Court
works. We sit in benches. Generally, our Constitution Bench will
consist of five Judges only. And the
other eleven Judges will sit in
benches of two and three to hear
other matters.
In other words, on any one day, several cases may be argued and adjudicated simultaneously?

Yes, at any one time, several
cases are heard. We have five or six
courts which hear cases concurrently. From among the eleven Justices, four courts may be comprised
of two Judges each, with one Court
of three Judges, which will constitute the fifth court. This fifth court is
the Constitution Court. So at the
same time, we are six courts sitting.
And when the Constitution Court is
not sitting, then we are able to have
six or seven Courts. Generally,
when the Constitution Bench is not
convened, we normally sit in a
Bench of three.
Is there a minimum number of Justices per Bench?

The minimum number has to be
two. A single Judge cannot decide
anything.
What happens, then, if each of the
two Justices should decide differently
on the same point of law?

If two Judges do not agree, then a
third Judge will join them. Or the
Chief Justice will constitute another
Bench of three Judges. You see,
five Judges is the minimum for Constitutional matters. But we have a
large amount of work which is not
constitutional at all-cases which
do not arise under the Constitution.
For example, a private suit between
A & B or a criminal prosecution
which does not involve any con-

Quite right. These are appeals
from the High Courts.
Article 124 (2) states that mandatory
retirement for the Supreme Court
Judges must occur at age 65. Is this
always the case or are exceptions ever
made?

The age of retirement for the Supreme Court Judges is 65. This is
mandated. No exception can be
made because, under the Constitution, no one can sit as a Judge of the
Supreme Court after he attains the
age of 65.
I believe the Indian Constitution
provides for a pension for Supreme
Court Justices upon retirement?

Yes. There is a scale according to
which the pension is admissible to
retiring Judges . Although the pensions have been increased, we do
not receive the same amount
through the pension as we receive
through our pay.
What percentage of the Judge's salary does the pension represent?

As an example, the salary of the
Chief Justice of India is approximately 4,000 rupees a month ($625
per month), and some small allowances in addition. My salary is
now 5,000 rupees a month, plus
some sumptuary allowance of 500
rupees ($62.50) and a car allowance
of 300 rupees ($37.50) and a free
official residence in which I am residing presently. Those are the
terms of my appointment. The
maximum pension, therefore,
which I would be entitled to is
36,000 rupees ($4,500) a year.
The official salary of the Chief Justice amounts to slightly over $600 per
month. It would appear that accepting the position of Chief Justice or
Judge of the Supreme Court would
constitute a financial sacrifice?

A great amount of sacrifice is involved in accepting the Judgeship in
India for a member of the Bar. The
Judgeships are normally offered to
the leading members of the Bar. In
fact, at the time that I was appointed
a Judge, I was in a fairly large prac-

tice. But when my Chief Justice of
the High Court asked me whether I
could accept the Judgeship, I very
readily agreed. It was a very great
honor to become a Judge and therefore I did not mind.
Unfortunately, today, money has
really lost its value. The value of the
rupee has fallen and members of the
Bar are really not too eager to accept a Judgeship. Because, you see,
one cannot really compare his income as a lawyer with his salary as a
Judge, however large the salary
may be.
But what of the remunerations apart
from the Judge's salary? I should
think that assuming the position of
Judge of the Supreme Court of India
would provide one of the most significant ways to influence and affect
the practice of law?

Well, it is very rewarding work
that the Judge does. Life does not
totally consist of making so much
money or not making so much
money. And if everyone said ''unless a large amount of money was
involved," he would not do his
work, then we would have no courts
of law at all in India.
Which has been the most important
or meaningful decision to you, since
your appointment as Chief Justice?

It is very difficult to pinpoint any
particular decision as being of the
greatest significance because I have
participated in quite a few important
decisions. But one of the most important decisions in which I was a
participant was the case known as
the ''fundamental rights'' caseKeshavand Bharti, 1973, S.C.R.I.
I became a Judge of the Supreme
Court in August 1972. The hearing
in Keshavand Bharti began in
November, 1972 and lasted four
months. We delivered our judge~
ment in April of 1973.
Keshavand Bharti concerned the
question as to whether the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution could be amended by virtue of the powers conferred by Article 368--the "amending clause"so as to restrict, abridge or take
away these fundamental rights. At
that time, the provision of the Constitution allowed for fourteen Supreme Court Judges. We were thirteen Judges in Keshavand-the
(continued on next page)
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largest that has sat in the Supreme
Court. The entire Court was thus
occupied with hearing one case and
nothing else. Lawyers were complaining that their cases were piling
up and there was no Supreme Court
to ask for a determination about
matters such as bail or early hearings. Therefore, it was necessary to
appoint one more Judge and two
more ad hoc Judges so that a Bench
of three Judges could hear some
other matters.
The main argument in Keshavand
Bharti was made on behalf of the
petitioners by Mr. Palakhwala, who
is now our Ambassador to the United States. We were divided in our
decision 7 to 6. I was among the
minority of 6. But it was held by
the majority of 7 that the power of
amendment of the Constitution
shall not be exercised so as to take
away the fundamental rights of the
people. In fact, a new theory was
evolved by the majority-that there
are certain basic features of the
Constitution and you cannot amend
the Constitution so as to destroy
those basic features. For example,
the basic feature of the Constitution
that India is a democracy cannot be
amended so as to make India a
monarchy.
But your vote in Keshavand was
among the dissenting voices?

Yes, I was among the minority of
6. I held that the power to amend
is a very broad and untrammeled
power. The people possess the
power to amend in any manner as
the chosen representatives of the
people may desire. In fact, I was in
favor of allowing amendments with
regard to any matter that Parliament
may wish. I said, in Keshavand,
that the power to amend can be
exercised even so as to scrap the
Constitution and replace it by
another Constitution. I said that no
generation has the right to say that it
will really bind all future generations. Life can interpose such vast
changes that succeeding generations may think that the Constitution which was enacted some years
back is wholly inadequate for meeting the new challenges of the times.
Would you describe briefly how the
Indian Constitution may be
amended.

The power to amend can be found
12

in Article 368, which provides for
the entire procedure. Amendment is
by two-thirds vote of each House of
Parliament. And there are some
provisions of the Constitution for
which ratification by the State Governments is also necessary. An
amendment which directly affects
the State will require ratification by
that State.
As you are aware, the Supreme
Court of the United States has recently rendered the Bakke decision,
holding that race may be a factor
when an applicant is considered for
admission into state supported universities. However, race may not
generally be a factor upon which to
base a quota system for admitting
applicants, particularly if there is no
evidence of past discrimination by
the university. Do you view Bakke as
having any import for the Judiciary
of India or any impact upon India's
socioeconomic structure?

At the present time, I do not regard the decision in Bakke as having
any direct applicability to the conditions of India.
Three articles of the Indian Constitution mandate equality before the law.
Article 14 contains the general provisions of equality before the law and
equal protection of the laws; Article
16 mandates equality of employment
opportunities; and Article 29 requires equality of education for all
with regard to state supported universities.
Would
you
explain the apparent inconsistency of
Article 15 (4) which allows for special
provisions for educationally and socially backward citizens?

But you see, Article 15 (4) is not
contradictory because the very
basis of the theory of equality is that
equal persons should be treated
equally. Now if there are socially
backward persons, economically
backward persons, then such persons are not equal with others. So,
therefore, special provisions ought
to be made for their advancement.
Now, in fact, it is a violation of
the equality clause contained in Article 14 to treat unequals as equals,
because equality is for equals. For
example, if socially there are unequal persons, then one common
law for the lion and the lamb is not
equality. It is inequality. There is a
definite need for classification.

Even the doctrine of equality allows
for a classification to be made,
thereby permitting persons who are
classified differently to be treated
differently. You can give different
treatment to persons who are placed
in different classes. But you can
only classify persons differently
under Article 14 provided there
exists some rational basis for classifying them differently.
I would like to ask you about your
decision in State of U. P. v. Pradip
Trandon, AIR 1975 SC 563, which
held that "reservation of seats for
medical students in Medical Colleges
for candidates from rural areas is
unconstitutional." Would you explain why special consideration for
rural candidates has been disallowed, in light of article 15 (4)?

The question to discern is really
this-are the individuals who seek
special consideration really
economically backward? Are they
socially backward?
The rationale of the Pradip Trandon decision can only be that rural
candidacy is not a valid basis of
classification. Because, you see,
you must find some differentia,
some characteristics which distinguish those who are classified or put
in a class from those who are left out
of that class. Now, rural and nonrural is no classification for there
can be advanced people or economically advanced people in the rural
areas. So to say merely that you live
in a rural area and therefore there
shall be some reservation or assistance for you in medical colleges is
really to confer an unintended, significant advantage on persons who
do not deserve it.
In India, there are a large number
of castes. The numbers are
limitless-there are literally hundreds of castes. If you said all persons belonging to a certain caste or
from a certain section of the country
will have a reservation of seats in
the medical universities, it would
not be good. Because all persons
belonging to that caste or from a
certain part of India are not necessarily backward. Therefore, the
concern of the Supreme Court has
been to see that this constitutional
purpose-a reservation for the
deserving-is not frustrated. The
Supreme Court must provide a
safeguard to see that this purpose is

not really abused or misused by
permitting State Governments or
the Central Government to make
reservations for classes which do
not deserve special consideration.
Are the conditions of social and educational backwardness two distinctly
independent criteria or must one be
both socially and educationally
backward to receive special consideration under the Constitution of India?

Both conditions need not necessarily be present in any one particular situation. One condition alone
may suffice. An individual may be
educationally backward because
statistics and social studies have revealed that for generations there are
castes in which education has not
really made any appreciable impact.
In such a situation you can say that
this caste will receive a particular
preference in the matter of reservations. But you could not merely say
that all persons belonging to class
"x" will be preferred everywhere.
Must statistics be provided to substantiate a claim of educational or
social backwardness in matters relating to Constitutional provisions for
special consideration?

In India, the law is as follows.
Anybody who comes to the Court
alleging that there is a law or rule
which discriminates against him
must show from the face of the impugned law that there is in fact discrimination. If that is established or
shown, then the burden is on the
Government-which has issued the
notification or the rule or has passed
the law-to justify the passing of the
law and the furtherance of the discrimination. Now that can be done
only by citing statistics. Otherwise,
the law will fail.
The Government then must bear the
burden of formulating and producing statistics?

The burden is always on the Government to produce statistics to
show that there has not been discrimination towards this particular
caste or group.
You stated earlier that you did not
anticipate any direct impact of the
Bakke decision within India. Would
you explain why you do not foresee
someone from an educationally or
socially advanced caste complaining

of reverse discrimination?

I do not think it is possible to
complain of reverse discrimination
in India. You see, we are still grappling with our peculiar social and
economic problems. And there are
so many socially and economically
backward communities and castes
in India that we must first help them
stand on their feet. Reverse discrimination is only for very sophisticated and advanced countries like
the United States.
But are there not demonstrators now
protesting the special provisions
made within the Universities of the
State of Bihar?

Well, the so-called "forward"
communities are bound to revolt,
for it is often their children who are
denied an opportunity to gain admission into the medical colleges,
the law colleges and other institutions.
Do you anticipate reverse discrimination becoming a legal problem in
India within the next 5 to 10 years?
Once the lives of a substantial
number of citizens are improved, will
there not be grounds for an argument
against reverse discrimination?

Well, there can be an argument,
even today, about reverse discrimination. But I do not think such an
argument has a fair chance of succeeding, given our present context
and structure. I do not anticipate
such an argument being made and
succeeding for the next few years at
least.
Article 21 states the "No person shall
be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by law. Is the concept' 'procedure established by law"
comparable to that of "due process"
of the law under the 5th and 14th
Amendment of the United States
Constitution?

ing of why the concept of due process
was discarded?

The concept of due process was
discarded because as the American
judges themselves have said, due
process varies from judge to judge
according to his own notions of
what is constitutional and what is
not, and what is desirable and what
is not. Ultimately it comes to this.
Does an individual judge think that
it is good for the community or not?
Then the judge brings his own social
concepts, his own economical concepts, into the decision making
process.
Therefore, the writers of our
Constitution really discarded that
concept and said there shall not be
due process. These writers instead
wrote that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law. However, by our
recent decisions, we have almost
imperceptibly begun to make an encroachment into the limited field of
Article 21, without accepting the entire American concept of due process.
In one of our recent judgments,
the case of Manekha Gandhi, we
have introduced some measure of
the due process concept into Article
21. And in the latest judgment of the
Supreme Court, the President's reference on the Constitutional validity of the "special courts" bill, we
have said that it is not sufficient that
there is some law which provides
for the deprivation of life or personal liberty. It is necessary that
there be a law which provides for
the taking of life or personal liberty
and that law has to be just and fair,
not arbitrary or capricious.
Would you explain your reference to
the "special courts" bill? Does this
bill concern the trial of Mrs. Indira
Gandhi?

No. This bill does not deal with
Mrs. Indira Gandhi. It concerns
persons who are alleged to have
committed offenses during the
period of the Emergency.

At the time Article 21 was
enacted, I do not think that the writers of the Constitution intended to
incorporate the American concept
of due process into Article 21. In
fact, the debates of the Constitutional Assembly would show that
due process as a concept was discussed by our founding fathers and
was discarded.

Would there not be an argument that
special courts convened to adjudicate
the interests of one person or one
group of people contravenes the Constitutional requirement of equality
before the law?

Would you relate your understand-

(continued on page 17)
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THE ELDERLY- SOME CONCERNS FOR LAWYERS
By
Marvin Ernst, Ph.D.
Doctor Ernst is Director of Research , Dallas Geriatric Research
Institute in Dallas and adjunct professor to the Center for Studies in
Aging, North Texas State University and the Gerontology Service
Program, University of Texas
Health Science Center at Dallas.
He is the author of Sensitizing
People to the Processes of Aging,
Recognizing Social Losses in the
Elderly, and co-editor of Sensory
Processes and Aging, as well as
numerous articles in lay and professional publications.
The most rapidly increasing segment of the American population
are those people aged 65 or older. In
1900, only four per cent of the total
population in the United States was
this age . By the year 2030, shortly
after the baby-boom of the late
1940's and early 1950's reach 65, it
is estimated that 17 per cent of our
population will be aged 65 or older.
This represents an increase in
people from three million in 1900 to
twenty-two million in 1979, to fiftytwo million in 2030.
As the aged population expands,
both in gross numbers and in percentage of overall population , it begins creating problems for the
society-at-large and for us, as individuals. Society's problems eminate from an increasingly dependent population which has many financial, health and adaptation problems. For individuals, it means an
increased likelihood that we will
come into contact with older adults
who demand both personal and professional time. In 1900, most of the
elderly were still gainfully
employed. The length of time spent
with debilitating disease was relatively short and family responsibilities deemed that the family
take care of their aging relative. In
1979, few of the aged are gainfully
employed. Diseases tend to be
chronic and long-termed and family
responsibility has been replaced by
a highly differentiated service system. For those of us in human service occupations, i.e., physicians,
social workers, lawyers, these demographic changes increase the
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probability that we will have direct
contact, in a professional role, with
elderly people, some of whom have
severe problems in adjusting to old
age. While most people over the age
of 65 are in sound financial, physical
and emotional shape, the older a
person gets , the higher the likelihood of deficits in several areas of
their life. It is known, for instance,
that only five per cent of all persons
65 years of age or older are in institutions. Yet, that figure increases
with age until almost 50 per cent of
all persons over the age of 80 are so
placed.
As professionals who deliver a
human service, it is essential that
we understand some of the unique
problems which may be facing our
older clients. While space does not
permit a full expose of all of the
problems of aging, there are a
number of crucial physical changes
which may intrude upon the
client-professional relationship affecting the outcome of our interaction with older adults. These
changes fall within the general
ruberic of perceptual alterations
which may affect the older person's
ability to intake and assimilate auditory and visual stimuli. While
these changes are not found solely
in older adults, and while not all
older adults suffer from these deficits, there is an increased probability of their existence in an older
adult population. The specific
changes to which I allude are
changes in vision, hearing, and cognitive functioning .
As we age, most of us experience
some decline in visual acuity. Typically, we adapt quite well to these
slight changes. However, rapid vision loss can severely affect our integration into the world around us.
It is known that rapid vision
changes may occur for many people
in the mid-forties and after the age
of seventy. Three common vision
difficulties are found among the elderly. These are: (a) Presbeopia-the
inability to see close objects clearly;
(b) Color Vision-red, yellow and
orange are better seen by the aging
eye; and (c) Cataracts, or a cloudi-

ness or opacity in the lens of the
eye. These changes mean that dependence upon a visual message for
communication with an older person is contingent upon the size of
lettering, the color contrast on the
printed message, and the lighting
conditions under which the material
is to be read. Small, black print on
blue paper, read in high intensity
lighting is virtually impossible for an
older person to read. The more diffused the lighting source, the more
distinct the letters from their
background, and the larger the
print, the greater the probability
that the message will be transmitted
accurately.
Hearing loss tends to be sex and
occupationally related . There is little evidence, for instance, that
people who reside in an environment where they are not exposed to
loud noises ever will have to lose
auditory acuity. In our noiseconducive society, however, research findings have shown that
men suffer auditory deficits to a
greater extent than women, and that
persons engaged in "high" noise
occupations experience considerable hearing loss . Evidence suggests
that older adults experience hearing
loss in any one of three ways. First,
because of atrophy in the basal end
of the organ of Corti, they experience an inability to hear high frequency sounds. Second, decline in
the number of neurons in the auditory pathway causes a loss in the
ability to discriminate speech.
Third, because of damage to the auditory canal, the volume of sound
transmitted to the brain is diminished.
The losses in auditory ability are
extremely frustrating to most
people. Researchers have found a
higher rate of depression among
older adults with hearing loss than
among people with visual dysfunctions. The most common approach
used when an older person cannot
hear us is to increase the volume of
our speech. Unfortunately, the
older adult who has experienced a
high frequency pitch loss still cannot distinguish what we are saying.

Even hearing aids that increase the
volume of the sound do not help.
It becomes necessary to use a variety of messages, rather than complete dependence upon a single
mode of communication. Auditory
messages can be enhanced through
the use of visual and tactile cues.
We can be certain that the person
knows that we are talking to them
and we can avoid the use of
specialized jargon which simply
confuses the older adult who has
never been exposed to our professional short-cuts to communication.
Finally, a number of elderly persons experience cognitive disruptions which decrease their ability to
respond to the stimuli around them.
It is important, however, that we do
not stereotype all elderly persons as
being "senile." A vast amount of
research literature suggests that
older adults can learn and comprehend new material as well as
younger people. Their basic intelligence level does not decline with
age. Conditions, however, such as
disease, poor nutrition, or the sensory deficits discussed earlier, can
retard an older person's cognitive
functioning. Of the entire elderly
population, approximately six per
cent have some degree of impaired
mental capacity. Over the age of 85,
this figure increases to about 20 per
cent. It is important to note, however, that these deteriorations are
not the result of age, per se, but
rather atypical biological conditions
which intrude upon the thought
processes. Frequently evidenced in.
memory lapses, many older adults
with cognitive breakdown respond
well to therapeutic intervention,
particularly if the underlying cause
is related to an environmental factor
which can be controlled, such as
with adequate nutrition or by pharmacological intervention.
The most important thing to remember when working with the
aged client is NOT to assume that all
people are mentally incompetent or
physically frail simply because they
walk with a decreased gait, have
wrinkles, or have gray hair. Most
elderly persons are able to adjust to
their changing circumstance if we as
human service delivery personnel
allow them the opportunity to adjust, and are sensitive to physical
changes which obstruct our ability
to communicate with older adults.

Alumni Officers Elected
At its meeting on November 29,
1978, the Law Alumni Association
Council elected Edward A. Copley,
Jr. '60 as President of the SMU Law
Alumni Association for 1978-79. A
partner in the firm of Akin, Gump,
Hauer & Feld, Mr. Copley served
as Chairman of the 1977-78 Law
School Fund.
Emily A. Parker '73 was elected
Vice-President and Maurice E.
Purnell, Jr. '66 was elected
Secretary-Treasurer of the Association. Robert L. (Skip) Trimble '64
was elected to the Chairmanship of
the 1978-79 Law School Fund.
Thomas P. Alexander '56, Sam P.
Burford, Jr. '67, Jack E. Crozier
'54, Gordon Hobgood '59, Herbert
S. Kendrick '60, Margaret Barrett
Martin '76, George G. Potts '47, and

Maurice E. Purnell, Jr. '66 were
elected to the Council for three year
terms.
A resolution of appreciation was
adopted thanking the members of
the Alumni Association Council
whose terms expired this year.
They are Robert M. Bandy '69,
Michael M. Boone '67, Jack L.
Coke '43, Robert E. Davis '58, Marshall J. Doke, Jr. '59, John D.
Jackson '70, Robert L. Trimble '64
and Ronald M. Weiss '55.
Resolutions of appreciation were
also adopted thanking Edward A.
Copley for his leadership of the successful Law School Fund, and William D. Powell '57 for serving as
President of the Law Alumni Association for 1977-78.

Legal Clinic Adds Staff Social Worker
Beginning with the start of the
spring semester, Mrs. Bernice
Waldman, A.C.S.W., S.P., becomes the first Director of Social
Services for the SMU Legal Clinic
programs. Funded with a grant from
the Greater Dallas Section of the
National Council of Jewish Women,
Mrs. Waldman brings a range of experience to the Legal Clinic that varies from private practice in individual and group therapy to work as
a psychiatric social worker for the
Dallas County Mental Health District.
Mrs. Waldman will be responsible for recruiting and training a
small cadre of volunteers to assist
her in her responsibilities. Together
with her volunteers, Mrs. Waldman
will provide clinic students from all
three clinics with a wide variety of
services designed to enhance the
lawyering process. For example,
Criminal Clinic students will be able
to request presentence reports and

suggestions for suitable sentencing
alternatives. On the civil side of the
docket, Mrs. Waldman and her volunteers will be heavily involved in
many phases of the child custody
cases and the juvenile delinquency
cases that are assigned to each student in the Civil Clinic.
Professor Steele, Associate Dean
for Clinical Education, initially approached the Dallas Section of the
National Council of Jewish Women
with the idea. "I want the students
to leave the clinic with a better understanding of where a lawyer's
work begins and ends and where the
work of other trained professionals
commences, " Steele said. "I am
very gratified by the enthusiastic response of the National Council to
this idea. I know that our students
will learn about what social work
can do for their clients, but more
importantly, I hope that they learn
about the difference between law
and social work," Steele commented.
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Coleman Leads
Successful
Library Fund

Telefund Results Predict
Record
Law School Fund
Robert L. (Skip) Trimble '64,
Chairman of the 1978-79 Law
School Fund, announced that this
year's telefund raised a record
$92,000 in pledges surpassing the
best previous total by 21%.
During the first two weeks of
February, law alumni met each
night in Lawyers Inn and called
classmates for contributions to the
scholarship fund for law students.
In all, 75 alumni gave of their time
and talent to insure a successful
telefund. Also, the Barristers conducted follow-up telephoning on the
final night of the telefund.

Assistant Dean Coultas attributed the tremendous success of the
telefund to Skip Trimble, a member
of the Dallas firm of Winstead,
McGuire, Sechrest & Trimble.
"Skip's leadership was evident in
the selection of team captains and
workers which served to establish
an organization dedicated to making
this telefund the best ever. Also, our
alumni were receptive to the callers
and sympathetic to the plight of our
law students faced with annual increases in tuition," stated Coultas.
This year's Law School Fund drive
will conclude on May 31, 1979.

James E. Coleman, Chairman of
the 1978-79 Law Library Fund announced that this year's furid has
exceeded last year's record total of
$17,280. This special solicitation is
separate from the annual Law
School Fund and is solely for the
support of the Underwood Law
Library.
Mr. Coleman, a University of
Virginia Law School graduate and
member of the Dallas firm of Carrington, Coleman, Sloman, Johnson
& Blumenthal, asked area law firms
and sole practitioners to join with
him and assist the law library in
maintaining its superb collection.
The response was generous with attorneys indicating they particularly
value the resources available in the
library and the capable assistance of
Law Librarian Earl Borgeson and
his staff.

Alumni hard at work during the annual telefund.
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The argument has in fact been posited. But you see, this again concerns the theory of classification .
The Supreme Court has held that
the classification of individuals who
have committed crimes during the
Emergency is a very valid classification. I delivered the majority judgment for the Court which consisted
of a Bench of seven, and wrote that
persons who are alleged to have
committed offenses during the
Emergency and persons who are alleged to have committed offenses in
normal times are two classes.
Therefore, you can enact a special
law for persons who have committed or who are alleged to have committed offenses during the period of
the Emergency.
Article 31 provides for Compulsory
Acquisition of Property. Article 31,
subdivision (1) states that "no person
shall be deprived of his property save
by authority of law." Have the requirements of a "just and fair" law
been judicially imposed upon this
provision also?

Not exactly. Under our Constitution, property can only be taken
away from the inoividual if for a
public purpose, because the right to
own property is a fundamental
right. Article 31, subdivision (l)
holds that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. And subdivision
(2-A) of Article 31 states that a public purpose is one which involves
the transfer of ownership or right of
possession of any property to the
State or to a corporation owned or
controlled by the State. We have
now interpreted those provisions to
mean that it is not necessary to pay
the market value or its just equivalent for acquiring private property
for a public purpose. But we have
also said in some decisions that this
does not mean usury compensation.
The amount of compensation paid
to acquire private property for a
public purpose must bear some
nexus with the market value.
Would you clarify further what the
Supreme Court has meant by "some
nexus to the fair market value?"

We have more specifically referred to a "rational" nexus. For
example, in one of my judgments I
said, if the Constitution confers a
fundmental right to own property

and if it provides that private property shall not be taken by the State
except for public purpose, then you
cannot take a person's "fortune for
a farthing and mock at his property
right." Thus, there must be a rational nexus between what the state
pays to the private property owner
and the market value of the property.
One further question with regard to
Article 31. Article 31, subdivision
(2), provides that the amount of
payment determined by the State
cannot be challenged in a Court of
law. Does this not preclude any adjudication of the "rational nexus"
requirement?

Well, the amount can in fact be
challenged. Article 31, subdivision
(2) has been amended and the
amount of payment can be challenged in the courts. And furthermore, in some of the cases the challenge has, to a limited extent, been
upheld by us.
Would Article 31, subdivision (2-A)
allow private property to be acquired
pursuant to a State law which cannot
be said to be a "compulsory acquisition" because there will not be a
transfer of property to the State? In
other words, does Article 31 (2-A)
permit private property to be taken
when it is not to be used for a public
purpose?

A law may deprive an individual
of his property but not provide for
the vesting of title to that property in
the State. Such a law would not be
"compulsory acquisition" as denominated by Article 31. But the
law would nevertheless be valid.
For example, supposing "A's"
property has been taken for a public
purpose, but for the use of some
corporation which is not Stateowned. In such a case, the property
does not vest in the State. It is then
not "compulsory acquisition." But
the property may still be taken ifit is
for a public purpose, if it is for the
purpose and benefit of the entire
community, although the object of
the law is not to vest title in the
State. If a private property right is
extinguished and correspondingly a
right in the property is created in the
State, then the law is for a public
purpose and simultaneously '· compulsory acquisition''. But the law
must be for a public purpose in

order to take private property validly.
What are the legal ramifications of
the situation wherein "A's" property is taken for a public purpose but
title to such property does not vest in
the State?

Compensation must still be paid
for this property. But in fact, the
majority of compensation payments
which have been made in our country have been incurred under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act
which provides for the payment of
the full market price.
One provision of the Indian Constitution differs markedly from that of the
United States Constitution. Article
143 allows the President of India to
consult and obtain the advice of the
Supreme Court upon a matter of
public importance. Would you comment on this? Under the United
States Constitution, such conduct
would constitute an advisory opinion
by the Supreme Court and would be
disallowed as a violation of the separation of the Executive and Judicial
branches of Government.

The President, of course, means
the Council of Ministers. But you
see, in the United States the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to cases and controversies.
We do not have that clause in our
Constitution. And there is no provision in the United States Constitution corresponding to Article 143.
That is why the American Supreme
Court does not give any advisory
opinions. It is only if a case or a
controversy arises that the United
States Supreme Court will give its
opinion.
Does the provision of Article 143
within the Indian Constitution in any
degree derogate from the Supreme
Court's independence as a separate
Branch of Government?

No, it does not. Because we are
asked for our advisory opinion upon
a legal question, not a political question. If the Executive Branch of
Government were to ask for an advisory opinion on a political question, we would generally decline.
The Supreme Court is not compelled to answer. Article 143 uses the
word "may" rather than "shall."
We will not entertain and respond to
( continued on next page)
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a political matter unless the political
question is very vague.
Does the giving of advisory opinions
consume a great deal of the Court's
time?

No, for there have been very few
opinions provided. During the last
28 years that our Constitution has
been in existence, there have been
seven or eight references, approximately one every three or four
years.
Would an advisory opinion have the
same force and effect as a legal decision rendered by the Supreme
Court?

That is a very sensitive problem.
The question becomes this-is the
advisory opinion binding as law declared by the Supreme Court under
Article 141. Article 141 of the Constitution says that the law declared
by the Supreme Court is binding
upon all the courts in India. If that is
so, then the question is whether the
advisory opinion is law. And the
majority of our decisions so far have
taken the view that an advisory
opinion is not law and therefore, it is
not binding. But in the latest cases,
for instance, that of the "special
courts bill," we have slightly struck
a new path and our position has become that we do not see any valid
reason for holding that an advisory
opinion is not binding as law. This is
so because we give an advisory
opinion after hearing all the parties
which are interested in the problem.
So why should it be that a decision
in a private case between ••A'' and
"B" on a question of law will bind
an entire country, but a decision on
a very important question, given
after hearing every conceivable
party which is interested in that
question, will bind no one?
Does not Article 143 also raise the
question of equality before the law,
when the President or Council of
Ministers may go directly to the Supreme Court for a decision on a question of law, but the citizen must
exhaustthelegalprocessthroughthe
lower courts?
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We have always taken the view,
as have the American courts and
every court in the world, that the
Government is entitled to be treated
differently from the private citizen
in many matters. For example, if a
person should occupy forcibly any
property belonging to the Government, then there are laws made in
several parts of the world under
which the Government can summarily remove that person. A private person could not. But those
laws have been upheld because the
Government is entitled to be treated
somewhat differently in some matters.
I would like to direct the next few
questions to the Constitutional provisions for a State of Emergency in India. Article 352 (1) and (3) state that
the President can declare a state of
emergency or Proclamation of
Emergency if a grave emergency
exists-such as war, external aggression or internal disturbance--or
if such a grave emergency appears to
be imminently dangerous. In your
opinion, were such grave conditions
in existence when Mrs. Indira Gandhi declared the State of Emergency
on June 26, 1975, and if so, what
were these condittions?

Well, this is a typical political
question, which a Judge finds very
diffiicult to answer. A Judge really
has no means of ascertaining the
answer. But the Emergency was
proclaimed on the basis that there
were such conditions. Whether
there were in fact such conditions or
not-well the Judge has no means of
determining this.

Emergency. Do the possibilities for
abuse disturb you?
It is quite right that there are no
present provisions for review. But
the Constitution is being amended
to provide for periodic review. I
have not yet seen this amendment
which was passed by Parliament.
But I believe the amendment provides that the Proclamation must be
reviewed every six months or after a
certain period of time. And if not
reviewed, the Proclamation automatically lapses.

Article 352 (2) (c) presently requires
approval by resolution of both
Houses of Parliament within two
months after the Proclamation of
Emergency has been declared. How
much Parliamentary approval is
required-two-thirds, a simple
majority?

I think it is by simple majority,
but I am not quite certain.
One final question, Mr. Chief Justice: Article 71 of the 1976 edition of
the Constitution states that Parliament may by law regulate the election of the President or VicePresident, including the grounds on
which such election may be questioned. Article 71 (3) states that the
validity of this law may not be questioned in any court. Has this article
been amended?

Yes, well it does concern every
Judge that any declaration of
emergency should be treated as
conclusive.

This article has in fact been
amended several times. It was first
amended to provide for the creation
of a separate tribunal for challenging the election of the President, the
Vice President and the Prime Minister. But that amendment was
amended to provide that such elections will not be challenged in a
court of law. I believe the present
Government has some different
thinking on this latter amendment.
But presently, as matters stand today, I believe the President's election or the Prime Minister's election
cannot be challenged, in accordance with the original provisions
(1950) of the Constitution.

Moreover, there are no provisions in
the Constitution for any periodic review of the Proclamation of

Thank you Mr. Chief Justice Chandrachud for responding so candidly
to my questions.

Article 352 (5) (b) states that the
Proclamation of Emergency is final
and conclusive. It cannot be challenged in any court of law in India.
Does that provision cause you concern?

Second Annual
Roy R. Ray Lecture
A Great Success
The Honorable
A. Leon Higginbotham

On March 2, Judge A. Leon Higginbotham of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit delivered the
Second Annual Roy R. Ray Lecture
entitled ''From Thomas Jefferson to
Bakke - Race and The American
Legal Process."
The Judge was greeted by an enthusiastic standing room only
crown in Karcher Auditorium. The
theme of Judge Higginbotham's
speech mirrored his critically
acclaimed book "In The Matter of
Color - Race and The American
Legal Process: The Colonial
Period." The book is the first in a
series to be published by the Judge
on race relations and the legal process in the United States.
The lecture provided disturbing
insights into the treatment of blacks
during the American Colonial
Period and disclosed how the laws
of the various colonies sanctioned
the unequal treatment of blacks.
Colonial newspapers ran advertisements offering slaves for sale as
well as rewards for returning runaway slaves who "had done nothing
except dared to dream that they too
could be free." The graphic depictions of the slave trade and treatment of slaves used by Judge Higginbotham throughout the speech
were intended to raise the student's
consciousness to a new plateau that

hopefully would be reflected in their
practice of Ia w. At the conclusion of
the speech, he received a standing
ovation .
Later in the afternoon, Judge
Higginbotham met informally with
students and answered questions
about constitutional law, race relations, and other topics of current
interest. All were impressed by the
Judge's immense knowledge of
legal history and grasp of constitutional law. As one student later
stated, "Being able to listen to and

ask questions of Judge Higginbotham was a highlight of my law
school career."
The annual Roy R. Ray Lecture
was established at the SMU School
of Law by Professor Emeritus of
Law Roy R. Ray. Through Professor Ray's generosity the School of
Law is able to bring a scholar of
national eminence to campus for a
lecture and discussion of a legal
topic of current interest to law students, lawyers, judges and the
community at large.

Judge Higginbotham interpreting a point of law.
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Brice and Barron Fund

Crow Speaks at First

Tartt Hosts

Videotape Series

Strasburger & Price

Houston Reception

Lecture
Professor Walter Steele , Associate Dean for Clinical Education, has announced that the firm of
Brice and Barron, Dallas, Texas,
has provided the law school with
funding for production of a series of
videotapes to demonstrate various
steps in the lawyering process, with
emphasis on court-room procedure.
Professor Steele explained that
those involved in clinical education
have noted the frequent repetitiveness of the problems students commonly face as they progress through
their clinical experiences. The idea
for the use of videotape stems from
the assumption that it will save
supervisors' time, and provide the
student with an enhanced understanding of the process about which
he seeks to learn if, instead of having his question answered orally by
a supervisor, the student's question
is answered by watching a brief videotape presentation of a lawyer engaged in that very process.
Examples of some of the topics to
be covered by the tapes are: How to
Qualify an Expert Witness, Conducting a Child Support Contempt
Hearing, How to Take a Witness on
Voir Dire, etc. Production of the
tapes has already begun, Professor
Steele announced. The tapes are
being prepared in cooperation with
the Southern Methodist University
Department of Media Services and
will be of a high professional quality
suitable for use in other law schools,
according to Professor Steele.
"We are very grateful to the firm
of Brice and Barron for the interest
and originality shown by them in
making it possible for us to produce
this innovative series of films. I believe that this effort is a major step
forward in the methodology of clinical education," stated Professor
Steele.
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Trammell Crow, local real estate
developer and entrepreneur, joined
with Don Williams, attorney and
managing partner of the Trammell
Crow Company, in presenting the
First Annual Strasburger & Price
Lecture at the School of Law.
Mr. Crow and Mr. Williams led
an enthusiastic audience in an informal discussion of current trends
in real estate law and the inner
workings of the Trammell Crow
Company. Numerous questions
from the audience provided those in
attendance with a unique opportunity to learn about the Dallas real estate business from the man whose
company built Bryan Tower, the
World Trade Center and Loews
Anatole Hotel.
The Annual Strasburger & Price
Lecture Series was recently established at the School of Law by the
Dallas law firm of Strasburger &
Price for the continued enhancement of the educational environment at SMU and in the Dallas
Community.

The Placement Office at the Law
School is always ready to serve the
need for associates or students for
part time work. Resumes can be
sent or the rirm can set up an interview with our students at the
School. About three weeks advance
notice should be given.

Blake Tartt (' 59) and his wife
Barbara opened their home to
Houston area law alumni in
mid-April for the annual reception.
Dean Ad Interim A. J. Thomas,
Jr., Associate Dean for Clinical
Education Walter Steele , and Assistant Dean Edward 0. Coultas attended from Dallas. The Dean Ad
Interim briefly described recent developments at the School of Law. It
was noted that both the quality and
quantity of applicants to the School
continue to increase even though
tuition and fees for the next
academic year will be approximately $4800.
The event was well attended by
the growing number of Houston
area law alumni.

McGowan Hosts
North Texas
Reception
William J. McGowan, II ('70) of
Brownfield hosted a reception for
North Texas area alumni at the
Lubbock Club in early May.
Dean Ad Interim A. J. Thomas,
Jr. addressed the group of alumni
and noted that although the Dean
Search Committee has been hard at
work, it does not appear that the
Dean vacancy will be filled by the
beginning of the fall term.
Several attorneys traveled to
Lubbock from surrounding towns
to meet with the Dean Ad Interim,
learn about the School and visit with
other alumni in the North Texas
area.

Faculty Notes

Professor Thomas B. Black spoke in
March to the Federal Bar Association's
1979 Southwestern Region Conference
in Dallas. His subject was "Evidence A Comparison of Texas Common Law
and the Federal Rules."
Dean Charles O. Galvin spoke to the
Town & Gown Club on March 19, 1979.
His subject was "John Adams &
Thomas Jefferson to Racehorse Haynes
& Melvin Belli."
Professor John Kennedy spoke on
Federal Jurisdiction at the Dallas Bar
Association's Basic Federal Practice
Seminar in January. He also spoke on
Federal Practice and Procedure at the
Federal Bar Association's 1979 Southwest Regional Conference in Dallas in
March and was a panelist at the Workshop on Class Actions in Title VII Litigation, Labor Law Section, at the Arkansas Bar Association in Arkadelphia
in March.

Professor Frederick C. Moss acted as
the Assistant Team Leader to Professor
Robert Keeton of Harvard University at
the National SemiRar For Advanced
Trial Advocacy held March 14-18, at the
University of Florida at Gainsville.
Associate Dean S. Theodore Reiner deIi vered a paper entitled "Effects of
Governmental Incentives and Disincentives on Petroleum Production: Federal
Taxation a Case in Point," at the
Southwest Legal Foundation's 19th
Annual Institute on Petroleum Exploration & Economics.
Professor Jeswald W. Salacuse lectured in March at the Near East Studies
Center of UCLA on the topic "Trilateral Investments in the Middle East: Is
Three a Crowd?" He also attended the
meeting of the Committee on Law in the
Middle East of the Social Science Research Council in New York City.
Professor Daniel W. Shuman spoke to
Audiologists and Speech Pathologists at
SMU on "Legal Rights and Responsibilities of Teachers in Education of the
Handicapped.''

Professor William P. Streng participated (March 15-16) in the Washington
D.C. national meeting of the International Fiscal Association with respect to
U.S. Tax Treaties . He also spoke at The
American Management Association
Dallas International Taxation Program
(March 19) on Overseas Executive
Compensation Planning.

Dean Ad Interim A. J. Thomas, Jr.
spoke before the Journal ofAir Law and
Commerce Symposium on "Maritime
Aviation Losses and Conflict of Law"
at the new Loews Anatole Hotel in Dallas.
Professor Peter Winship spoke to the
Dallas Bar Association's Corporate
Counsel Section on "The Proposed
Federal Securities Code." He has also
been elected Vice-Chairperson of the
Section of Commercial, Contract and
Related Consumer Law of the Association of American Law Schools for
1979-80 and Chairperson-designate of
that Section for 1980-81.

PERHAPS
the reason your name isn't listed in the ALUMNI MILESTONES section is that we haven't heard
from you recently.
Use this handy news notes blank and tell us a little about how your life has changed recently. ALUMNI MILESTONES will be a regular feature of each iss_~e of The Brief. Your friends do
care!

NAM- _ ___________________

Class Ye a r_ _ _ _ _ __

ADDRESS. _ __ _ __ __ _ __ __ _ __ __ _ __ __ __ _ _ __

Dear ALUMNI MILESTONES: You may be interested to know that

Clip out and mail to: Criss Stone, School of Law, SMU, Storey Hall, Dallas, Texas 75275.
THANK YOU!
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ALUMNI MILESTONES1932
H. Fred Martin, Jr., Judge for the Occupational Safety & Review Commission attended a judicial seminar at
Dartmouth College, in Hanover, New
Hampshire, November 6-9, 1978.

1935
R. L. Dillard, Jr., retired October 1,
1978 as General Counsel of Southland
Life Insurance Co., after 33 years of
service. Mr. Dillard is currently "of
Counsel" to Saner, Jack, Sallinger &
Nichols in Dallas.

1948
James 0. Faires and Edgar J. Garrett,
Jr. ('75), have formed the partnership of
Faires & Garrett in Dallas.

1949
Roderick L. Shaw, began another 4-year
term as County Judge in Lubbock in
January 1, 1979. This will mark the 15th
year Judge Shaw has served as County
Judge in Lubbock.

1953
Robert J. Cowan, of Midland, has been
certified in Estate Planning and Probate
Law by the Texas Board of Legal
Specialization.

1954
Joe B. Brown, was appointed by the Dallas County Commissioner's Court to
serve as Judge of County Court at Law
No. 2 in Dallas.
Robert A. Gwinn, of Seay, Gwinn,
Crawford, Mebus & Blakeney, has been
certified a Specialist in Personal Injury
Trial. Mr. Gwinn has also been elected a
Director of the Dallas Bar Association
1979-80.
'

1955
Aubrey V. Burkett, is District Counsel
for the Forth Worth District of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.
Rufus Higginbotham, has been
employed as Assistant to Dr. W. A.
Criswell of the First Baptist Church in
Dallas since March, 1977.

1957
C. R. Anderson, moved to Breckenridge, Texas upon graduation in 1957.
He is presently serving as General
Counsel for the Petroleum Corporation
of Texas in Breckenridge.

1959
Gene Ater, formerly a partner in the
Odessa law firm of Ater & Hirsch, was
elected Judge of the 70th Judicial Dis22

trict Court in November, 1978, and was
sworn into office on January 1, 1979.
Ernest Steve Watson, is Vice President
and General Counsel of the First Arkansas Bankstock Corporation in Little
Rock.

1961
Charles Joplin, has served as President
of the New Mexico Bankers Association, and is on the Board of Directors of
the El Paso Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank and the Board of Regents of
the New Mexico Military Institute. Mr.
Joplin is now with the Security National
Bank in Roswell.
Scott Wang, is associated with the Leo
A. Daly Co. of Omaha, Nebraska.

1962
Reese L. Harris, was certified in 1978 by
the Texas Board of Legal Specialization
as a Specialist in Civil Trial Law.
E. Lawrence Merriman, has recently
moved to Longview and is with the firm
of Nichols & Parker.
Benjamin L. Sturgeon, has established
his own law office in Amarillo.

1963
Robert Bush, is currently serving his
second term as a member of the Texas
House of Representatives. He is also
serving on the Appropriations and Business and Industry Committees.

1964
Fred Kolodey, of Kolodey & Thomas,
has been elected to the Board of Directors of Farah Manufacturing Co.

1965
Robert M. Blackmon, was sworn in as
Judge, County Court at Law No . 1,
Nueces County, on January 1, 1979.
Gayle Goldstrich Cannon, is currently
Assistant General Counsel for the Pizza
Inn, Inc. in Dallas.

1966
Larry Feldman, has been elected to
Who's Who In American Law Marquis.
He has also been certified by the State
Bar of Texas as a Specialist of Personal
Injury Trial Law and Civil Trial Law.

He was formerly Vice-President and
Trust Officer at the First National Bank
in Dallas.

1968
Jerry John Crawford, has been elected
County Judge in Denton, Texas, and
began his term on January 1, 1979.
Peter G. Keane, has recently been appointed Chief Assistant Public Defender
in San Francisco, California.
John P. Krouse, was certified a
Specialist of Criminal Law by the Texas
State Bar Board of Legal Specialization
in December, 1978.
Robert N. Virden, was certified in December, 1978 by the Texas State Board
of Legal Specialization as a Specialist in
Estate Planning & Probate Law. Mr.
Virden is currently Vice-President &
Trust Officer in charge of Estate & Personal Trust Administration at the Texas
American Bank in Dallas.

1969
Charles H. Robertson and Ronald L.
Wilkinson ('66) have relocated and incorporated. Included among the
employees of the professional corporation of Robertson & Wilkinson, Inc. of
Dallas are Thomas Railsback ('69) and
Elizabeth Segovis ('78).
Larry Silver, is Tax Manager of Milchem, Inc., in Houston. He is also a
member of the Texas State Board of
CPA's.
Mike M. Tabor, of Dallas, has been certified as Specialist in Civil Trial Law by
the Texas State Board of Legal
Specialization.

1970
Thomas R. Adkins, is presently Assistant Regional Counsel of the Department of Energy in Dallas.
Ronald L. Goranson, is Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Dallas
County Criminal Bar Association, 1979.
Sandy Kaufman, has rejoined the firm of
Touche, Ross & Co. in Dallas as Manager in the Tax Department. Mr. Kaufman previously worked with the firm as
an intern while attending the Law
School.

1967

1971

George G. Brin, of the Corpus Christi
firm of Dyer & Redford, will assume the
position of President of the Neuces
County Bar Association in June, 1979.
R. Mack Lewis, Jr., became associated
with the firm of Malouf, Lynch &
Jackson in Dallas on January 1, 1979.

Ira D. Elnsohn, has become a partner in
the Dallas firm of Gardere, Porter &
DeHay on January 1, 1979.
Al Ellis, has been chosen Boss of the
Year 1978, by the Dallas Association of
Legal Secretaries.
Stephen C. Mahood, is Vice-

President & General Counsel of
SEDCO, Inc., in Dallas.

1972
Steve Barnett (LLM '76) was elected

Assistant Secretary - Corporate Attorney of Dresser Industries, Inc. in Dallas.
William Frank Carroll, of the Dallas
firm of Clark, West, Keller, Sanders &
Butler has been elected Vice-President
of the Dallas Association of Young
Lawyers.
Jay Counts, has recently returned to
Dallas from Washington, D. C. to practice labor law with the firm of Hewett
Johnson Swanson & Barbee.

1973
Fred Biery, has been elected Judge of
County Court No. 2, Bexar County,
Texas, effective January I, 1979. Mr.

Biery was formerly in private practice.
John S. Bordelon and Jean C. Breaux,

Jr. have formed the partnership of
Bordelon and Breaux in Lafayette,
Louisiana, specializing in the practice of
taxation and estate planning.
Donald E. Godwin, became a partner in
the Dallas firm of Seay, Gwinn, Crawford, Mebus & Blakeney on January I,
1979.
R. Brent Harshman, has accepted a pos-

ition in the Legal Department of
Diamond Shamrock Corporation, Oil
and Gas Unit in Amarillo, Texas. Mr.
Harshman was formerly with the Texas
Gas Transmission Corporation in Houston.
Donald Stevenson, has been employed
as Associate General Counsel & Corporate Secretary for Hunt International
Resources Corporation in Dallas since
December 1978.
Henry H. Werner, is a partner in the
newly established firm of Gunn, Stuckey & Werner in Kansas City, Missouri.

1974
William Alan Bell, has been appointed to

the position of Vice-President in charge
of legal affairs for Florida Hospital Associates.
Burton Cohen, is currently involved in
financial planning and investment advising in El Paso, Texas.
William S. Hart, recently formed the
professional corporation of Legg & Hart
in Houston. Mr. Hart is also serving as
adjunct professor at South Texas College of Law where he is teaching Bills &
Notes for the Spring Semester, 1979.

Douglas B. Owen, has been promoted to
tJ1e Chief of the State & County Affairs

Division, serving under Mark White,
Attorney General of Texas.
Peter G. Pierce, III was elected to the
City Council of the City of Nichols
Hills, Oklahoma, on April 3, 1979.
William Dixon Wiles, became a partner
in the Dallas firm of Bailey, Williams,
Westfall, Lee & Fowler on January I,
1979.

1975
Steven R. Fredrickson, is an Assistant

City Attorney with the Minneapolis City
Attorney's Office.
Edward F. Gilhooly, is practicing
maritime law as well as petroleum marketing law in the Law Department of
Gulf Oil Corporation in Bala Cynwyd,
Pennsylvania.
Robert W. Hutcheson, is the Referee for
the Probate & Juvenile Courts, Greene
County, Ohio. He is also an associate of
Wead & Aultman in Xenia, Ohio.
George White, has established his own
private law practice in Irving.

1976
Richard J. Billik, Jr., is an attorney with

the U. S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, in Washington, D.C.
Edward C. Hertenstein, is presently associated with the firm of Emens, Hurd,
Kegler & Ritter in Columbus, Ohio.
Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., was elected
prosecuting attorney of Cape Girardeau
County, Missouri on November 7, 1978.
Juliet Ling-Ling Lam, is currently working as a real estate agent with the Bill
Rush Company in Richardson.
Linda S. Robinson, is an Assistant Prosecutor in St. Charles County, Missouri.
William D. Sheppard, is now serving' 'of
Counsel" with the firm of Woolsey,
Fisher, Whiteaker & Stenger in
Springfield, Missouri.

1977
John M. Alton, of the Columbus, Ohio

firm of Lane, Alton & Horst is specializing in litigation, predominantly representing insurance companies.
Paul N. Gold, is associated with the Dallas law firm of Wilson, Menaker and
Branson.
Alexander William Kent, has established his law office and is concentrating
on the practice of domestic and international law in Coral Gables, Florida.
Marcy Kelley Leachman, is associated

with the Dallas firm of Locke, Purnell,
Boren, Laney & Neely.
Robert T. Mowrey, became associated
with the Dallas firm of Locke, Purnell,
Boren, Laney &NeelyinJanuary, 1979.
He previously clerked for the Honorable Harry Phillips, Chief Judge, U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Paul G. Yale, is presently working for
the Dallas firm of Kolodey & Thomas.

1978
Lawrence G. Boyd, is working in litiga-

tion for the Dallas firm of Johnston and
Feather.
Todd A. Hunter, is practicing law with
the Corpus Christi firm of Meredith,
Donnell & Edmonds.
Kip Merrill Kugler, is practicing law
with the Dallas firm of Fiedler & Fortescue.
Thomas J. Sagehorn, is now working as
Legal Counsel for Ponderosa Systems,
Inc., in Dayton, Ohio. His legal responsibilities will primarily relate to land acquisition, building construction and
lease negotiation for Ponderosa restaurants.
Charla J. H. Tindall, is practicing law at
the Dallas law office of Patricia A. Hill.
Mrs. Tindall has been concentrating in
the areas of medical malpractice, estate
& probate and family law. She attended
a medical seminar in Antwerp, Belgium
in September 1978.
·
MARRIAGES
Richard J. Billick '76 to Alison R.

Umstead.
Robert M. Blackmon '65 to Marta Angola MCL '64 of Buenos Aires, Argen-

tina.
Linda S. Robinson '76 to Kent W. Fan-

ning.
BIRTHS
Alexander William Kent '77 and his wife

became the happy parents of a baby girl,
Alexandra Johanna, in May, 1978.
Steve A. Mandell '77 and his wife Eileen
proudly announce the birth of their son,
Josh, born January 11, 1979.
Hal Moorman '76 and his wife are the
proud parents of a son, Ted Moorman,
born January 4, 1979.
Alvin A. Ohm '68 and his wife Jean
proudly announce the birth of their
daughter, Megan Kathleen, born February 2, 1979.
DEATHS
Mildred Louise Everett Vilott '74, on Oc-

tober 18, 1978.
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"History is a voice forever sounding
across the centuries the laws of
right and wrong. Opinions alter,
manners change, creeds rise and fall,
· but the moral law is written on
the tablets of eternity. For every false
word or unrighteous deed, for
cruelty and oppression, for lust or vanity,
the price has to be paid at last; not
always by the chief offenders, but paid
by someone. Justice and truth alone
endure and live. Injustice and
falsehood may be long-lived, but
doomsday comes at last to them,
in French Revolutions and other
terrible ways." James Anthony Froude
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